The Future of Consumer Credit Regulation. Proposal for a Multi-layered Consumer Image by Vannerom, Johan
Working Paper, Workshop 13.12.2013: "Nudging in Europe". 
 1 
 
The Future of Consumer Credit Regulation. 
Proposal for a Multi-Layered Consumer Image 
 
§1. Introduction 
1. (Shortcomings of the) Information Paradigm – When overlooking European Consumer 
(Credit) legislation, one notices the information paradigm takes a leading role as the optimal 
consumer protection mechanism
1
. According to the information paradigm, the stronger 
contracting party has to provide mandatory information to its weaker counterparty, in casu the 
consumer. After having read, studied and analyzed the information the weaker contracting 
party is able to make a carefully thought-out decision. The consumer can thus give its 
informed consent. The outcome is an agreement, which is supposed to be in the best interest 
of both.  
The information paradigm is seriously criticized. Studies in (behavioral) economics illustrate 
that the information paradigm is not flawless
2
. The consumer is overloaded with documents 
and brochures and it is not always clear whether he understands or even reads all the 
documents
3
. Furthermore it is questionable whether the information leaflets will protect the 
consumer suffering from unforeseen economic loss. For example losses suffered due to the 
economic crisis or to an illness. 
2. Lack off Interest for Alternative Policy Choices – Although the positive effect of (pre-
)contractual information on the level of consumer protection is criticized, no profound 
(European) research has sofar been conducted on contractual protection mechanisms vis-à-vis 
consumer credit agreements. Examples of such mechanisms are interest rate caps, the right of 
early repayment and the termination of a credit agreement in case of default. 
3. Limited Balance of Interests – Another problem that occurs is highlighted by law and 
economics’ studies. They indicate that rules on consumer protection can only be effective if 
the legal framework achieves a high standard of consumer protection at a minimal cost to 
creditors
4
. It is questionable whether European and national legislators take these Law and 
Economics’ findings into account, since they disregard studies which show the 
disproportional costs of the information paradigm for creditors. 
4. Paper overview – The paper starts with the main reason for choosing the information 
paradigm in current EU consumer credit regulation, i.e. the information asymmetry. Though 
also a creditor is confronted with a certain lack of information vis-à-vis the consumer (e.g. 
                                                 
1
  E.g. artt. 4, 5-7 and 10-12, incl. Annexes II and III Directive 2008/48/EC of 23 April 2008 on credit 
agreements for consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC, Pb.L. 133 of 22 May 2008, 66-92. 
2
  A.o. I. RAMSAY, "From Truth in Lending to Responsible Lending" in G. HOWELLS, A. JANSSEN and R. 
SCHULZE (eds.), Information rights and obligations. A challenge for party autonomy and transactional 
fairness, Hampshire, Ashgate, 2005, 51. 
3
  G. HOWELLS en T. WILHELMSSON, “EC Consumer Law: Has It Come of Age?”, E.L.Rev. 2003, 380-381; 
C. SUNSTEIN (ed.), Behavioral law and economics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000, 59-187. 
4
  IP/A/IMCO/ST/2006-20, Broad economic analysis of the impact of the proposed directive on consumer 
credit, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/comparl/imco/studies/0704_consumercredit_en.pdf, 42. 
Working Paper, Workshop 13.12.2013: "Nudging in Europe". 
 2 
when conducting the consumer's creditworthiness assessment), we will only focus on the 
information asymmetry on the consumer side. The information paradigm is currently the 
readiest response of European and national legislators to tackle the problems arising from the 
information asymmetry. This paper will list the shortcomings of the information paradigm in 
the field of consumer credit. Secondly, we will address the consumer image. We will see that 
the consumer image is not unproblematic. In fact, even the Court of Justice uses two different 
images of the consumer. In an attempt to enhance consumer protection, we propose to set up a 
multi-layered consumer image in a final paragraph. To make it more viable, we shall apply 
our multi-layered consumer image to consumer credit law. 
§2. Information paradigm 
5. Information asymmetry on consumer side – When signing the (credit) agreement the 
consumer should pay attention to the specific characteristics of the product or service. 
Moreover, he must know the normal use of that product or service. There will not be a truly 
informed decision ("informed consent") if he does not have a correct understanding of these 
two elements
5
. If not, an information asymmetry exists. There are two ways to solve this 
information asymmetry
6
. Either one merely has confidence in the functioning of the free 
market or one accepts that information requirements have to be legally imposed. 
6. Criticism on the information paradigm – In this paragraph we discuss both solutions, 
although the legislator often (instantly) chooses for mandatory information disclosure. 
However (behavioural) law and economics studies show certain market failures undermine 
the usefulness of the information paradigm as an optimal method of consumer protection in 
the field of consumer credit. Examples of such market failures are higher transaction costs, 
the free-rider problem, behavioural abnormalities which cause consumers to not always act 
rationally, a lack of real choice for the consumer, etc. We look at this in more detail below. 
A. Solutions via the free market 
7. The market mechanism – In principle, the free market itself should provide for a correct 
and competitive price(-setting). Ideally, the consumer is looking for and collecting 
information on the terms and conditions of the credit agreement. Creditors, who charge too 
much, thus price themselves outside the competitive market. This mechanism operates in a 
market with (quasi-)perfect information for all parties involved. Ideally, the creditor even 
provides willingly prospective consumers all the information needed in order to attract as 
many clients as possible. The prospective consumer studies the terms and conditions and 
finally takes a rational decision, based upon the information obtained and acquired. Some 
observations to this ideal image of the free market have to be made. 
                                                 
5
  O. BAR-GILL, "The Behavioral Economics of Consumer Contracts" in O. BAR-GILL and R. EPSTEIN, 
Consumer Contracts: Behavioral Economics vs. Neoclassical Economics. An exchange between Oren Bar-
Gill and Richard A. Epstein, http://ssrn.com/abstract=982527, New York University School of Law, 2007, 
38. 
6
  There exists also an information asymmetry on creditor side. After all, he must assess the creditworthiness 
of the consumer. He does not have perfect information here. The consultation of data bases or direct 
information gathering of the consumer does not give him a complete and/or accurate picture of the financial 
situation of the consumer. In this paper we do not look closer at this problem. After all, we focus on a 
critical evaluation of the information paradigm as a method of consumer protection. 
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8. Transaction costs of seeking consumer – Firstly, the image of the seeking consumer is 
an utopian image
7
. Not every consumer looking long enough or even looking for the correct 
information. Sometimes this behaviour can be explained by the irrational choices certain 
consumer make. Nonetheless, also rational consumers shall stop at a certain stage their quest 
for information. More precisely, when the research costs outweigh the advantage that one 
hopes to achieve from the credit agreement
8
. 
9. Free-rider problem – Secondly, a creditor does not always benefit if he willingly and 
fully discloses information to the consumer. The free-rider problem tempers his desire to give 
complete and accurate information. The hope of a competitive advantage is after all rather 
quickly superseded by the fear that the transaction costs made, will also serve for the benefit 
of competing creditors. After all, they have little additional transaction costs. Indeed the 
creditor, who fully informed the consumer, has already provided lots of general information 
that should not be repeated by other creditors
9
. 
10. Behavioural deviations – Thirdly, certain behavioural abnormalities lead to market 
failures in the market for (consumer) credit. The main behavioural abnormalities are: 
 "Information overload"; 
 procrastination of the consumer; 
 "Loss aversion"; 
 "Mental accounting"; and 
 the "Status quo bias"10. 
11. Behavioural deviation (I): information overload – Consumers are inundated with 
advertisements, prospectuses, pre-contractual information brochures, etc.
11
. This information 
overload leads to three possible market failures, i.e.: 
                                                 
7
  R. HYNES and R. POSNER, "The Law and Economics of Consumer Finance", Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 2002, 
172-173. 
8
  A. I. OGUS, Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1994, 128. 
 Cf. also POSNER: "(...) incompletely informed decisions are rational when the costs of acquiring more 
information exceed the likely benefits in being able to make a better decision". Cf. R. POSNER, Economic 
analysis of law, New York, Aspen Law and Business, 2003, 18. 
9
  O. BAR-GILL  and E. WARREN, "Making Credit Safer", U. Pa. L. Rev. 2008, 117-120; C. CAMERER, S. 
ISSACHAROFF, G. LOEWENSTEIN, T. O'DONOGHUE and M. RABIN, "Regulation for Conservatives: 
Behavioral Economics and the Case for 'Asymmetric Paternalism'", U. Pa. L. Rev. 2003, 1252; R. HYNES 
and R. POSNER, "The Law and Economics of Consumer Finance", Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 2002, 173. 
10
  CBFA, Verslag over het bevorderen van de financiële kennis in België, 
http://www.cbfa.be/nl/consultations/lop/pdf/2008-10_promotion.pdf, 2008, 23-25; D. DE MEZA, B. 
IRLENBUSCH and D. REYNIERS, Financial Capability: A Behavioural Economics Perspective, 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/consumer-research/crpr69.pdf, 2008, 22-52. 
11
  E.g. the General Regulations of April 1, 2010 of ING Belgium NV is 77 pages long. 
(http://www.ing.be/xpedio/groups/transaction/@transaction/@ibe/@homebank/documents/portalcontent/06
0776_nl.pdf). 
 BAYOT, MONNIER and ROLAND analysed on behalf of the POD Maatschappelijke integratie the socially 
responsible nature of advertisements for credit facilities in the Belgian market. Cf. B. BAYOT, T. MONNIER 
and L. ROLAND, Zijn reclame en verkooppraktijken voor kredietopeningen verantwoord?, Réseau 
Financement Alternatif, 2010, 18-45. 
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 not reading the information; 
 incorrectly processing the obtained information; and 
 the deception of the consumer. 
Firstly, many consumers lose their mind when overlooking the vast amount of information 
leaflets. They then choose to avoid all of it or almost everything
12
. This does not necessarily 
include irrational behaviour. The high information processing costs do not outweigh the 
eventual benefits, such as obtaining a cheaper credit agreement
13
. 
Secondly, the unclear information overload also emphasis the negative consequences of 
cognitive defects each man have. A consumer possibly incorrectly processes the information. 
He may also overestimate his own financial knowledge
14
. This 'knowledge'-optimism is 
common to both low- as high-skilled individuals
15
. Finally, the average consumer often does 
not understand the language and content of the information brochures. Thus, DE MUYNCK 
states that "a common critique is that European information requirements tend to prefer the 
side of the seller's/provider's professional wording instead that of the consumer"
16
. It is 
therefore important that the creditor provides the information in an understandable manner to 
the consumer
 17
. 
Thirdly, the information overload increases the risks on misleading consumers. It leads 
consumers in fact away from the core (terms and conditions) of the credit agreement. The 
                                                                                                                                                        
Cf. also a study of OIVO showing that consumers become more critical in the processing of advertising 
messages. OIVO, Het verzet van de consument, http://www.oivo-crioc.org/files/nl/6208nl.pdf, 2011, 37p.; 
X, "Belgische consument wantrouwt reclame", De Standaard October 19, 2011. 
12
  G. HOWELLS and T. WILHELMSSON, "EC Consumer Law: Has It Come of Age?", E.L.Rev. 2003, 380-381; 
TH. WILSON, N. HOWELL and G. SHEEHAN, "Protecting the Most Vulnerable in Consumer Credit 
Transactions", JconsP 2009, 124. 
13
  V.P. GOLDBERG, "Institutional Change and the Quasi-Invisible Hand", Journal of Law and Economics 
1974, 485; D. M. GRETHER, A. SCHWARTZ and L. L. WILDE, "The Irrelevance of Information Overload: an 
Analysis of Search and Disclosure", S. Cal. L. Rev. 1985-1986, 279-280; C. WILLETT, Fairness in 
consumer contracts: the case of unfair terms, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2007, 42-43. 
14
  D. DE MEZA, B. IRLENBUSCH and D. REYNIERS, Financial Capability: A Behavioural Economics 
Perspective, http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/consumer-research/crpr69.pdf, 2008, 50; I. RAMSAY, "From Truth 
in Lending to Responsible Lending" in G. HOWELLS, A. JANSSEN and R. SCGULZE (eds.), Information rights 
and requirements. A challenge for party autonomy and transactional fairness, Hampshire, Ashgate, 2005, 
52. 
15
  G. HOWELLS and T. WILHELMSSON, "EC Consumer Law: Has It Come of Age?", E.L.Rev. 2003, 381; C. 
SUNSTEIN (ed.), Behavioral Law and Economics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000, 59-187. 
16
  M. DE MUYNCK, "Credit Cards, Overdraft Facilities and European Consumer Protection. A Blank Cheque 
for Unfairness?", ERPL 2010, 1222. 
17
  Cf. also art. 5 Directive 93/13/EC which states that "in the case of contracts where all or certain terms 
offered to the consumer are in writing, these terms must always be drafted in plain, intelligible language. 
Where there is doubt about the meaning of a term, the interpretation most favorable to the consumer shall 
prevail";  BIS, "A Better Deal for Consumers. Economic Narrative", http://www.bis.gov.uk/files/ 
file52074.pdf, 2009, 22; R. INCARDONA and C. PONCIBÒ, "The average consumer, the unfair commercial 
practices directive, and the cognitive revolution", JconsP 2007, 34; J. KÖNDGEN, "Policy Responses to 
Credit Crises: Does the Law of Contract Provide an Answer?" in S. GRUNDMANN and Y.M. ATAMER (eds.), 
Financial Services, Financial Crisis and General European Contract Law. Failure and Challenges of 
Contracting, Kluwer Law International, Alphen a/d Rijn, 2011, 46; R. STEENNOT, "Sanctionering van 
inbreuken op het consumentenrecht: de zoektocht naar een rechtvaardige oplossing" in F. EVERS and P. 
LEFRANC (eds.), Kiezen tussen recht en rechtvaardigheid, Bruges, Die Keure, 2009, 146; A. TIFFE in 
cooperation with M. FEIGL, "Best Practice beim verantwortlichen Kreditgeschäft – Corporate Social 
Responsibility in der Bankenpraxis", http://www.verantwortliche-kreditvergabe.net, 2008, 82-83. 
Working Paper, Workshop 13.12.2013: "Nudging in Europe". 
 5 
more information you give or how more certain elements of the information are emphasized, 
the more likely it is that people are being misled
18
. This criticism is often tackled by adopting 
formal requirements
19
. 
12. Behaviour deviation (II): procrastination – Research showed that every man wants to 
consume in short term, but to pass the costs of consuming on to the future
20
. This behaviour is 
not entirely irrational. Money has after all a time value, i.e. by taking into account the future 
value of X EUR today
 21
. Information, in particular advertising, however, can play a negative 
role. Emphasising the need to possess a particular good in conjunction with advertisements 
for obtaining easy credit may encourage consumers to consume rather than to save money 
and/or to pay off other debts. The rules on misleading and aggressive commercial practises 
are adopted in order to prevent excesses. One can also warn borrowers about the 
consequences of their procrastinating behaviour
22
. DE MUYNCK pleads for a text message that 
should alert consumers when using credit cards: 
                                                 
18
  D. DE MEZA, B. IRLENBUSCH and D. REYNIERS, Financial Capability: A Behavioural Economics 
Perspective, http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/consumer-research/crpr69.pdf, 2008, 49-50; H. JACQUEMIN, 
"Focus sur certains mécanismes de protection du consommateur de produits et services financiers en 
matière contractuelle" in H. DAEMS, I. DE MEULENEERE, R. FELTKAMP, C. HOUSSA and R. STEENNOT 
(eds.), Bescherming van de consument in het financieel recht. La protection du consommateur en droit 
financier, Limal/Antwerp-Oxford, Anthemis/Intersentia, 2012, 134; J. LACKO and J. PAPPALARDO, The 
effect of mortgage broker compensation disclosures on consumers and competition: A controlled 
experiment, http://www.ftc.gov/os/2004/01/030123mortgagefullrpt.pdf, 2004, 7-8; R. STEENNOT, 
"Sanctionering van inbreuken op het consumentenrecht: de zoektocht naar een rechtvaardige oplossing" in 
F. EVERS and P. LEFRANC (eds.), Kiezen tussen recht en rechtvaardigheid, Bruges, Die Keure, 2009, 146-
147. 
19
  C. CAMERER, S. ISSACHAROFF, G. LOEWENSTEIN, T. O'DONOGHUE and M. RABIN, "Regulation for 
Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for 'Asymmetric Paternalism'", U. Pa. L. Rev. 2003, 
1230; R. INCARDONA and C. PONCIBÒ, "The average consumer, the unfair commercial practices directive, 
and the cognitive revolution", JconsP 2007, 32; R. STEENNOT, "Informatieverplichtingen als 
beschermingstechniek bij de verwerving van beleggingsdiensten door consumenten" in H. DE WULF, R. 
STEENNOT, M. TISON and C. VAN DER ELST (eds.), Van alle markten. Liber Amicorum Eddy Wymeersch, 
Antwerp-Oxford, intersentia, 2008, 795; A.S. VANDENBERGHE, "Over de nieuwe zwakheden van de 
consument en wat eraan te doen", Ars Aequi 2009, 393; T. VAN DYCK, De geharmoniseerde 
prospectusplicht. Kritische analyse van de geharmoniseerde prospectusplicht in de Prospectusrichtlijn 
2003/71/EG en haar omzettingswetten in België, Nederland, Frankrijk, het Verenigd Koninkrijk en 
Duitsland, Bruges, Die Keure, 2010, 98. 
20
  R. H. STROTZ, "Myopia and inconsistency in dynamic utility maximization", Review of Economic Studies 
1956, 180. This idea is also found in behavioural economic studies under the term "Hyperbolic Discounting 
Utility", cf. a.o. D. DE MEZA, B. IRLENBUSCH and D. REYNIERS, Financial Capability: A Behavioural 
Economics Perspective, http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/consumer-research/crpr69.pdf, 2008, 23; E. PHELPS 
and R. POLLAK, "On Second-Best National Saving and Game-Equilibrium Growth", Review of Economic 
Studies  1968, 185-199. 
21
  A. VAN DE VELDE, Inleiding tot het financiewezen. Financiële markten, producten en instellingen analyse, 
werking en risico's, Bruges, die Keure Business & Economics, 2011, 43; C. VAN HULLE with the 
cooperation of M. DUTORDOIR, K. SMEDTS, K. DE COCK, H. DRIJKONINGEN, T. LIEVENS and A. 
VANDERLINDEN, Bank- en financiewezen, I, Leuven, Acco, 2010, 12. 
22
  D. DE MEZA, B. IRLENBUSCH and D. REYNIERS, Financial Capability: A Behavioural Economics 
Perspective, http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/consumer-research/crpr69.pdf, 2008, 30. 
 Cf. also art. 5, §2 WCK that oblige lenders to include in certain advertising messages following sentence: 
"caution, borrowing money has also to be paid". 
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"Dear Sir/Madam. The funds on your current account are insufficient to cover the cost of this 
transaction. If you wish to pursue your buying, be aware that besides a charge of x EUR, an 
interest rate of x percent will be due. Please press 1) CANCEL if you wish to refrain from the 
transaction of 2) OK if you wish to continue"
23
. 
13. Behaviour deviation (III): loss aversion – In 1776 SMITH stated that "the chance of gain 
is by every man more or less overvalued, and the chance of loss is by most men undervalued, 
and scarce by any man, who is in tolerable health and spirits, valued more than it is worth"
24
. 
14. Behaviour deviation (IV): mental accounting – People divide their assets in different 
'mental' accounts. One account is reserved for the education and training of children, another 
for retirement savings, yet another for the purchase of food and medicine. However, money is 
money. THALER found that consumers sometimes choose to buy a TV, a car, etc. on 
installments, while they still have sufficient money standing on their saving account. In the 
consumer's head these savings are, however, reserved for another purpose. This is no rational 
behaviour
25
. 
15. Behaviour deviation (V): 'status quo'-bias – Men like to stay with their initial choice. 
They fear that a change of mind/direction will deteriorate their position or their assets. A loss 
arising from an action outweighs any loss caused by an omission to take action
26
. This 
behavioural deviation plays a role when reviewing credit agreements and/or choosing for an 
early repayment
27
. One must admit that sometimes the information vis-à-vis early repayment 
and/or the revision of credit agreements is unclear or lacking
28
. 
16. Lack of real choice – Finally, the consumer does not always have a real choice when 
signing a credit agreement
29
. This defect may arise from the financial need for money to buy 
certain goods or services. It may also be the result of a weaker negotiating position. Indeed, it 
                                                 
23
  M. DE MUYNCK, "Credit Cards, Overdraft Facilities and European Consumer Protection. A Blank Cheque 
for Unfairness?", ERPL 2010, 1228. 
Cf. also the warning that the lender, pursuant to art. 11 WCK, should include in the Standard European 
Consumer Credit Information form on "Missing payments could have severe consequences for you (e.g. 
forced sale) and make obtaining credit more difficult." Cf. Annex I to the WCK. 
24
  A. SMITH, An inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, London, W. Strahan and T. 
Cadell, 1776, 107. 
25
  R. THALER, "Mental Accounting and Consumer Choice", Marketing Science 1985, 199-200. 
26
  W. SAMUELSON and R. ZECKHAUSER, "Status Quo Bias in Decision Making", Journal of Risk and 
Uncertainty 1988, 38. 
27
  H. SHUI and L. AUSUBEL, Time Inconsistency in the Credit Card Market, http://ssrn.com/abstract=586622, 
2004, 50p., showing that consumers of their own will not often change from lender. 
28
  J.P. ABRAHAM, "La formation des taux d'intérêt en Belgique. Le point de vue économique", T.Vred. 1995, 
1995, 63; L. COPPENS, "Gevangen in je woonkrediet", De Standaard August 20, 2011. 
29
  TH. WILSON, N. HOWELL and G. SHEEHAN, "Protecting the Most Vulnerable in Consumer Credit 
Transactions", JconsP 2009, 120-125. 
 Cf. BIS, "A Better Deal for Consumers. Economic Narrative", http://www.bis.gov.uk/files/file52074.pdf, 
2009, 3 and 5-8. 
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is often difficult for a consumer to negotiate in full equality the terms and conditions of the 
credit agreement
30
.  
17. The creditor's reputation as a solution? – Imperfect information does not necessarily 
lead to inefficient results. A creditor abusing the consumer's information asymmetry to 
achieve higher profits may suffer reputational damage in the long run
31
. However, the 
competition on the credit market is sometimes biased. Credit agreement are sometimes tailor-
made, i.e. it takes into account the creditworthiness of that specific consumer
32
. It is thus 
difficult for consumers to share their experiences with certain creditors
33
. Difficult, but not 
impossible though. It just takes longer to expose the bad reputation of a particular creditor
34
. 
But the risk of reputational damage alone seems inadequate and/or insufficient to protect 
consumers in the field of consumer credit. Nonetheless, initiatives to introduce the creditor's 
reputation as a method of consumer protection are always welcome. The Belgian government 
recently wants to condemn financial institutions that repeatedly offer risky investments to 
their clients to higher penalties. The penalty can also be made public, so that the financial 
institution could suffer reputational damage
35
. 
B. Solutions through legislation 
18. Need for rules – We can conclude that the market mechanism insufficiently provides 
(objective) information to the consumer. Thus, the legislator should intervene. He may 
impose information requirements to the creditor. Examples range from merely handing over 
information brochures to providing personal advise. The manner in which information is 
transmitted also plays an important role. One can also tackle the problem preventatively by 
                                                 
30
  J. DREXL, Die wirtschaftliche Selbstbestimmung des Verbrauchers, Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 1998, 329; V. 
ROPPO, "From Consumer Contracts to Asymmetric Contracts: a Trend in European Contract Law?", ERCL  
2009, 332; TH. WILSON, N. HOWELL and G. SHEEHAN, "Protecting the Most Vulnerable in Consumer Credit 
Transactions", JconsP 2009, 120-125. 
31
  V.P. GOLDBERG, "Institutional Change and the Quasi-Invisible Hand", Journal of Law and Economics 
1974, 486; A. GRIFFITHS, "Brands, business and social responsibility" in M. FAURE and F. STEPHEN (eds.), 
Essays in the Law and Economics of Regulation. In Honour of Anthony Ogus, Antwerp/Oxford/Portland, 
Intersentia, 2008, 204; L. KAPLOW and S. SHAVELL, "Fairness versus welfare", Harv. L. Rev. 2001, 1157-
1162; I. RAMSAY, "Regulation of consumer credit" in G. HOWELLS, I. RAMSAY, T. WILHELMSSON and D. 
KRAFT (eds.), Handbook of research on international consumer law, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2010, 
387. 
Cf. for investment products, current and savings accounts, a recent study indicates that a bank best 
positions itself as a trusted contract counterpart which guarantees proper and correct information. Cf. W. 
SINN, D. VATER, D. LUBIG and M. KASCH, Was Bankkunden wirklich wollen, Munchen/Zürich, Bain & 
Company Germany/Switzerland Inc., 2012, 23. 
32
  O. BAR-GILL  and E. WARREN, "Making Credit Safer", U. Pa. L. Rev. 2008, 122. 
 Or as COASE put it: "Nothing could be more diverse than the actual transactions which take place in our 
modern world". Cf. R.H. COASE, "The Nature of the Firm", Economica 1937, 396. 
33
  Cf. for example concerning the obscurity of rates for home loans: J.P. ABRAHAM, "La formation des taux 
d'intérêt en Belgique. Le point de vue économique", T.Vred. 1995, 1995, 63; L. COPPENS, "Woonkrediet 
wordt valstrik", De Standaard July 8, 2011; concerning the lack of clarity of bank tariffs: IP/10/1369 
[Investments, real estate and internet access: examples of inadequate consumer markets]. 
34
  Mouth-to-mouth advertising about a cheap and correct seller of household appliances or vice versa 
comments on a bad one will lead much faster to the build up or respectively the deterioration of a 
reputation. 
35
  N. TANGHE, "Regering voert schandpaal in voor banken", De Standaard February 15, 2013. 
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offering financial education. This formation is independent of a specific loan request. The 
purpose is to give every man the possibility to acquire a basic understanding of economic and 
legal concepts and of financial services. 
1. Information requirements 
19. Information and advice requirements – We limit ourselves below to a discussion of the 
information and advice requirements
36
 in European consumer (credit) law sensu stricto
37
, 
since the information requirements were fully harmonised by the European legislator. 
Below three types of information requirements are mentioned. More specifically, the rules on 
(i) advertising, (ii) pre- and (iii) contractual information. 
20. Advertising – Commercials are a first introduction to a credit agreement. The creditor 
wants to praise its credit agreement and its indispensability as good as possible. Correct 
advertising is thus important. Directive 2005/29/EC protects consumers in general terms 
against misleading and unfair commercial practices, including advertising
38 , 39
. Article 4 
Directive 2008/48/EC contains some standard clauses that a creditor must include in its 
advertising. The information must state "in a clear, concise and prominent way by means of a 
representative example" the basic contractual terms of the credit agreement. This includes a.o. 
information on the borrowing rate, the total amount of credit, the annual percentage rate, the 
duration of the credit agreement, the default interest rate, etc.
40
. Creditors have to take into 
account both provisions
41
.
 
In case of a conflict of law the principle "lex specialis derogat legi 
                                                 
36
  For the differences and similarities between an information and advice requirement: J. VORTMANN, 
Aufklärungs- und Beratungspflichten der Banken, Keulen, RWS Verlag Kommunikationsforum GmbH, 
2009, 1-4. 
37
  Cf. also the information requirements in Directive 2011/83/EU; Directive 2008/48/EC; Directive 
2005/29/EC; Directive 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of September 23, 2002 
concerning the distance marketing of consumer financial services and amending Council Directive 
90/619/EEC and Directives 97/7/EC and 98/27/EC, Pb.L. October 9, 2002, 16-24; Directive 2000/31 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of June 8, 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society 
services, in particular electronic commerce in the Internal Market, Pb.L. July 17, 2000, 1-16; Directive 
98/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of February 16, 1998 on consumer protection in the 
indication of prices or products offered to consumers, Pb.L. March 18, 1998, 27-31; Directive 94/47/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of October 26, 1994 on the protection of purchasers in respect 
of certain aspects of contracts relating to the purchase of the right to use immovable properties on a 
timeshare basis, Pb.L. October 29, 1994, 83-87; Directive 87/102/EEC; etc. 
 Also the proposals of the European Commission for new Directives start from information paradigm. Cf. 
a.o. COM(2011) 142 def. [Proposal for a Direcitve of the European Parliament and the Council on credit 
agreements relating to residential property]. 
38
  This prohibition of the diffusion of misleading information is a negative information requirement. There 
exist also positive disclosure requirements. A positive information requirement requires producers and 
suppliers of services to provide to the consumer the objective information needed so that he can close the 
agreement with knowledge. Cf. E. TERRYN, Bedenktijden in het consumentenrecht. Het herroepingsrecht 
als instrument van consumentenbescherming, Antwerp-Oxford, Intersentia, 2008, 34-35; T. VAN DYCK and 
V. COLAERT, "Reclameregulering als vorm van consumentenbescherming in C. BRUYNEEL, J.P. BUYLE, M. 
DELIERNEUX, J.F. ROMAIN and E. VAN DEN HAUTE (eds.), Liber Amicorum A. Bruyneel, Brussels, Larcier, 
2008, 35-36. 
39
  Moreover art. 3 (9) Directive 2005/29/EC allows Member States to introduce more stringent provisions for 
"financial services as indicated in Directive 2002/65/EC and immovable goods". 
40
  Art. 4 (2) Directive 2008/48/EC.  
41
  Art. 4 (4) Directive 2008/48/EC. 
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generali" applies. Unfortunately, the European legislator did not adopt a general framework 
on advertisements for credit agreements. The information requirements only apply if the 
advertisements mention the cost of credit
42
. The national legislator can oblige creditors to 
include standard information in any advertising for a consumer credit agreement sensu 
stricto
43
. 
21. Pre-contractual information – The creditor shall also inform the consumer during the 
contract negotiations that lead to the signing of the credit agreement
44
. The creditor shall 
provide the information on the basis of an European Standard Form, which is included in 
Annex II to Directive 2008/48/EC
45
. If the creditor has given this form to the consumer, he is 
presumed to have met his information obligation
46
. It is a rebuttable presumption
47
. 
Furthermore, the creditor shall provide the consumer with the standard form and a free copy 
of the credit agreement in due course before the credit agreement
48
.  
The consumer should alsohave sufficient time to reflect and overlook his options
49
. The 
consumer shall receive the necessary information in good time before signing the credit 
agreement in order to reflect quietly whether or not the credit agreement offered to him best 
suits his needs and capabilities
50
. Directive 2008/48/EC does not define the term 'good time'. 
The creditor and, in case of dispute, the court must/have to interpret the concept of a 'good 
time' in concreto
51
. Such an open standard has advantages and disadvantages. On one hand it 
                                                 
42
  In an earlier phase, it was possible to deduct a comprehensive framework for advertising from the wording 
of COM (2004) 747 final. [Amended proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council 
on the harmonisation of laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning 
consumer credit, repealing Directive 87/102/EEC and amending Directive 93/13/EEC], 5 -6, Eq. Recital 18 
in fine Directive 2008/48/EC, see also V. COLAERT and E. TERRYN, "Kredietpromotie" in E. TERRYN 
(ed.), Handboek Consumentenkrediet, Bruges, Die Keure, 2007, 66-70. 
43
  Consideration 9, 10 and 18 and in fine art. 22 (1) Directive 2008/48/EC; E. TERRYN and J. VANNEROM, 
"De nieuwe richtlijn consumentenkrediet en de implicaties voor de Belgische wetgeving" in VRG-Alumni 
(ed.), Recht in beweging – 16de VRG Alumnidag, Antwerp, Maklu, 2009, 30-31. 
44
  Also, the credit intermediary is subject to these pre-contractual information requirements (art. 5 (1) 
Directive 2008/48/EC. Pursuant to art. 7 Directive 2008/48/EC are "suppliers of goods or providers of 
services which ancillary act as credit intermediaries" exempted from these pre-contractual information 
requirements. 
45
  There apply additional or specific information requirements for credit agreements in the form of an 
authorised overdraft on an account and for certain specific credit agreements (art. 6 Directive 2008/48/EC). 
The information requirements are more limited in case of communication via speech recognition (art. 5 (2) 
Directive 2008/48/EC) 
46
  Art. 5 (1) in fine Directive 2008/48/EC. 
47
  Cf. also the prejudicial question of the Tribunal d'instance d'Orléans of May 30, 2013 in the case ECJ C-
298/13, Facet SA and BNP Paribas Personal Finance SA v. Saïda Bouchelaghem a.o. 
48
  If the lender has decided at the time of the request not to grant a credit to the consumer, then he may refuse 
to issue a draft credit agreement free of charge (art. 5(4) in fine Directive 2008/4).  
49
  At this stage we do not yet discuss about a cooling off period sensu stricto. TERRYN defines the cooling off 
period sensu stricto as "de 'afkoelmogelijkheid' na de totstandkoming van een zekere wilsovereenstemming, 
ongeacht of de overeenkomst nu als 'voorlopig' of 'definitief' gesloten moet worden beschouwd". Cf. E. 
TERRYN, Bedenktijden in het consumentenrecht. Het herroepingsrecht als instrument van 
consumentenbescherming, Antwerp-Oxford, Intersentia, 2008, 22 
50
  Art. 5 (1) Directive 2008/48/EC. 
Working Paper, Workshop 13.12.2013: "Nudging in Europe". 
 10 
provides flexibility for the contracting parties. On the other hand it leads to legal uncertainty. 
Ideally, the preparatory work had given an indication and/or criteria. 
22. Appropriate explanation – The creditor must in some cases give the consumer an 
appropriate explanation about the credit agreement
52
. This appropriate explanation is not an 
abstract concept, but should always be assessed in concreto
53
. It must allow the consumer to 
give his informed consent
54
. Thus the consumer must be informed about (i) the content and 
characteristics of the credit agreement and (ii) the utility and the purpose for which such type 
of credit agreement is normally used
55
. The creditor's explanation shall take into account (i) 
the repayment ability of the consumer, (ii) the risk, (iii) whether or not there is a fixed 
timetable, (iv) the ways of drawdown, and (v) the purpose of the requested credit
56
. The 
proposal of the European Commission in 2002 went even further. Creditors were required to 
request collateral and to grant an appropriate credit
57
. However, at the end of the legislative 
process the European legislator laid the final decision making power with the consumer.  
23. Contractual information – The third and final part of the information requirements 
concern the information that the lender must provide in the credit agreement itself
58
. The 
credit agreement must list the basic terms and conditions. 
The creditor must also communicate any change in the borrowing rate to the consumer during 
the execution of the contract. The notification should be made before the new borrowing rate 
is applied
59
. The creditor may also provide this information to the consumer periodically. This 
possibility should be stipulated in the loan agreement. Moreover, the new borrowing rate 
                                                                                                                                                        
51
  Cf. to make general conditions ("Allgemeine Geschäftsbedigungen") opposable under German law, § 
305(2) BGB requires that "wenn der Verwender bei Vertragsschluss ... 2. der anderen Vertragspartei die 
Möglichkeit verschafft, in zumutbarer Weise, die auch eine für den Verwender erkennbare körperliche 
Behindering der anderen Vertragspartei angemessen berücksichtigt, von ihrem Inhalt Kenntnis zu 
nehmen". Cf. also T. WILHELMSSON and C. WILLET, "Unfair terms and standard form contracts" in G. 
HOWELLS, I. RAMSAY, T. WILHELMSSON and D. KRAFT (eds.), Handbook of research on international 
consumer law, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2010, 170. 
52
  J. VORTMANN, Aufklärungs- und Beratungspflichten der Banken, Keulen, RWS Verlag 
Kommunikationsforum GmbH, 2009, 2. 
53
  E. TERRYN and J. VANNEROM, "De nieuwe richtlijn consumentenkrediet en de implicaties voor de 
Belgische wetgeving" in VRG-Alumni (ed.), Recht in beweging – 16de VRG Alumnidag, Antwerp, Maklu, 
2009, 33-34. 
54
  Art. 5 (6) Directive 2008/48/EC states that " that creditors [...]provide adequate explanations to the 
consumer, in order to place the consumer in a position enabling him to assess whether the proposed credit 
agreement adapted to his needs and to his financial situation" (own emphasis added). Cf. also 
consideration 27 Directive 2008/48/EC. 
55
  O. BAR-GILL, "The Behavioral Economics of Consumer Contracts" in O. BAR-GILL and R. EPSTEIN, 
Consumer Contracts: Behavioral Economics vs. Neoclassical Economics. An exchange between Oren Bar-
Gill and Richard A. Epstein, http://ssrn.com/abstract=982527, New York University School of Law, 2007, 
38. 
56
  COM(2002) 443 final, 14; cf. also art. 6 (2) COM(2002) 443 final, 38. 
57
  Art. 10 (2) Directive 2008/48/EG; C. HERRESTHAL, "Die Verpflichtung zur Bewertung der 
Kreditwürdigkeit und zur angemessenen Erläuterung nach der neuen Verbraucherkreditrichtlinie 
2008/48/EG", WM 2009, 1177-1179. 
58
  Art. 10 (5) and 12 Directive 2008/48/EC contain specific regulations for credit agreements in the form of 
authorised overdrafts on an account. 
59
  Art. 11 (1) Directive 2008/48/EC. 
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should be the result of a change in a reference rate, of which consumers can take note 
appropriately and which can be consulted in the offices of the creditor
60
. 
2. Financial education 
24. Some recent initiatives – A final way to inform the consumer is by giving financial 
education. The OECD and the World Bank published hereabout some recommendations
61
. 
Number of initiatives are launched within the EU
 62
. In Belgium schools already offered 
lessons on economics, money management...
63
. From 2014 economics will become a 
mandatory course in schools for secondary education
64
. 
Furthermore, the European Commission aims to boost the quality of financial education. 
While this is, according to the Commission, is essentially the responsibility of the Member 
States, the Commission proposes some possible action plans to install a better financial basic 
knowledge of consumers. This may include: 
 financing existing projects. The European Commission has already contributed in the 
past to support some projects
65
; 
 developing guidelines; 
 identifying and promoting best practices; 
 drafting innovative proposals66. 
                                                 
60
  Art. 11 (2) Directive 2008/48/EC. 
61
  OECD, "Recommendation of the Council on Good Practices on Financial Education and Awareness 
Relating to Credit", 2009, 
http://acts.oecd.org/Instruments/ShowInstrumentView.aspx?InstrumentID=78&Lang=en&Book=False; 
OECD, "Recommendation on Principles and Good Practices for Financial Education and Awareness", 
2005, http://www.oecd.org/finance/financial-education/35108560.pdf, 7p.; WORLD BANK, "Good Practices 
for Financial Consumer Protection", 2012, http://responsiblefinance.worldbank.org, 102p. 
62
  Concerning European initiatives: EUROPEAN INSURANCE AND OCCUPATIONAL PENSIONS AUTHORITY, 
"Report on Financial Literacy and Education. Initiatives by Competent Authorities", 2011, 
https://eiopa.europa.eu/fileadmin/tx_dam/files/publications/reports/Report_on_Financial_Literacy_and_Ed
ucation__EIOPA-CCPFI-11-018_.pdf, 38p. 
 An information site for consumers exists in France and in the United Kingdom: 
http://www.lafinancepourtous.com and https://www.moneyadviceservice.org.uk. 
 In Germany the Bankenverband (a German association representing the interests of private banks) Has 
started with some projects on financial education. For example Schul/Bank, an information platform for 
schools and teachers with information and teaching materials on economics and finance: 
www.schulbank.de. 
 Cf. concerning this matter S. DE BROUWER, "Financial Literacy in Europe" Bank Fin. 2011, 263-265; L. 
VAN CAUTER, "De bescherming van de financiële consument – Een overzicht van het regelgevend kader" 
in H. DAEMS, I. DE MEULENEERE, R. FELTKAMP, C. HOUSSA and R. STEENNOT (eds.), Bescherming van de 
consument in het financieel recht. La protection du consommateur en droit financier, Limal/Antwerp-
Oxford, Anthemis/Intersentia, 2012, 31-32. 
63
  For a brief overview of existing Belgian information programs: CBFA, Verslag over het bevorderen van de 
financiële kennis in België, http://www.cbfa.be/nl/consultations/lop/pdf/2008-10_promotion.pdf, 2008, 18-
22. 
64
  C. DE HERDT, "Economie wordt verplicht schoolvak", De Standaard October 11, 2011. 
 Cf. also the call of the Vlaamse Juristenvereniging for a debate on juridical literacy (B. DE GROOTE, "Geen 
juridische geletterdheid zonder toegang tot juridische basisinformatie", RW 2010-11, 302) 
65
  For example: the online information platform Dolceta (http://www.dolceta.eu/). 
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25. The purpose of education is fuelling financial capability – Financial education should 
lead to financially capable consumers, which can process the information obtained and 
actually implement it in their everyday lives
 67
. The term 'financial capability includes more 
than the term 'financial knowledge'. It means that the consumer: 
 has the necessary financial knowledge; 
 adopts an attitude reflecting his financial knowledge; and 
 also acts/behaves in a manner that is consistent with the financial knowledge he 
claims to possess
68
. 
Mandatory financial information alone is not sufficient. Financial education should ensure 
that consumers ultimately act consistently
69
. 
26. Target group of financial education – According to the European Commission, it is best 
to start as soon as possible with financial education
 70
. A Dutch study shows that a large 
majority of young people feel that schools have a role to play alongside the parents
71, 72
. 
§3. Multi-layered consumer image 
27. Information is good, but not always sufficient – Legislators are de lege lata in favour of 
the information paradigm. We have shown that the information paradigm alone falls short as a 
method of consumer protection
73
. Firstly, more information means in principle more 
                                                                                                                                                        
66
  COM(2007) 226 def. [Green paper on Retail Financial Services for Consumers in the Single Market], 18-
19; cf. also S. DE BROUWER, "Financial Literacy in Europe" Bank Fin. 2011, 261-263. 
67
  Y.M. ATAMER, "Duty of Responsible Lending: Should the European Union Take Action?" in S. 
GRUNDMANN and Y.M. ATAMER (eds.), Financial Services, Financial Crisis and General European 
Contract Law. Failure and Challenges of Contracting, Kluwer Law International, Alphen a/d Rijn, 2011, 
188-189; L. VAN CAUTER, "De bescherming van de financiële consument – Een overzicht van het 
regelgevend kader" in H. DAEMS, I. DE MEULENEERE, R. FELTKAMP, C. HOUSSA and R. STEENNOT (eds.), 
Bescherming van de consument in het financieel recht. La protection du consommateur en droit financier, 
Limal/Antwerp-Oxford, Anthemis/Intersentia, 2012, 31; T. VAN DYCK, De geharmoniseerde 
prospectusplicht. Kritische analyse van de geharmoniseerde prospectusplicht in de Prospectusrichtlijn 
2003/71/EG en haar omzettingswetten in België, Nederland, Frankrijk, het Verenigd Koninkrijk en 
Duitsland, Bruges, Die Keure, 2010, 85. 
68
  A. ATKINSON, S. MCKAY, E. KEMPSON and S. COLLARD, Levels of financial capability in the UK: results of 
a baseline survey, http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/consumer-research/crpr47.pdf, 2006, 10-11; D. LOERWALD, 
"How can we measure financial literacy", abstract written following an oral presentation during the 
Workshop "Are we Financially Illiterate? - Evaluation of knowledge and capabilities?" on the 
Internationale Konferenz zu Finanzdienstleistungen, Finanzdienstleister und Verbraucherschutz - zwei 
Welten?, Konferenz Reader, 2010, 38. 
69
  D. DE MEZA, B. IRLENBUSCH and D. REYNIERS, Financial Capability: A Behavioural Economics 
Perspective, http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/consumer-research/crpr69.pdf, 2008, 2-4. 
70
  COM(2007) 808 [Communication of the Commission – Financial education], 7-9. 
71
  NIBUD in cooperation with CENTIQ, "Financiële opvoeding 2010", NIBUD, 2010, 8p. 
72
  The Specific Teacher Training of Commercial Sciences at Hogeschool Gent started in 2010 with a project 
on "financial literacy". The purpose of the project is the elaborating of lessons for secondary education. 
 The European Economic and Social Committee also argues for the inclusion of financial education in the 
curricula of the schools. Cf. CES/11/82 of July 14, 2011, www.eesc.europa.eu; ECO/297, "Opinion of July 
14, 2011 of the European Economic and Social Committee on Financial education and responsible 
consumption of financial products (own-initiative opinion), http://www.eesc.europa.eu/?i=portal.en.eco-
opinions.15375, 2 en 4-6. 
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responsibility for the consumer on the choices made by him
74
. If one does not accept this, one 
has to deal with (a hidden form) of paternalism. Secondly, the functioning of the market alone 
will not lead to sufficient and correct information. Thus the legislator had to intervene to 
safeguard the (substantive) freedom of contract. Here, however, one took too little account of 
the various market distortions. 
This paper does not plead to throw everything overboard. No, mandatory information 
disclosure can be useful, but perhaps combined with other methods of consumer protection. 
28. Overview of difficulties – Looking for other methods of consumer protection, some 
questions and comments arise. Firstly, we note that the current definition of the consumer 
notion is still under discussion. Some legislative texts define the consumer as a natural person 
who acquires or uses products/services principally for non-professional purposes. Other 
legislation applies a more restrictive view of the non-professional nature. The consumer is a 
natural person acting exclusively for non-commercial purposes. The legal doctrine and justice 
is divided on this point
75
. 
Secondly, limiting the scope of application ratione personae of consumer law using the 
current consumer notion is not unproblematic. The majority assumes that the purpose of the 
consumer law is to protect the consumer against a stronger negotiating party. Recently, 
however, the question is whether one should not abandon a person-oriented view of the 
consumer and focus more on the interrelationship of the contracting parties. Consumer law 
should not protect only consumers but each party who is in a weaker bargaining position in a 
specific contractual relationship. One may wonder whether the definition of consumer credit 
should not be extended to small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). In principle one 
abolishes in this way consumer law sensu stricto. Only the consumer law sensu lato which 
aims to protect the weaker party against market failures subsists. 
Finally, we note that the consumer image is two-fold and that it has its shortcomings. The 
reference point is the average-informed and reasonably observant and circumspect consumer, 
who is able to take a rational decision provided he obtained sufficient and correct information. 
This forms the basis for the assessment of the legislative and judicial action in a situation-
specific consumer law. Legal rules are not written tailor-made to each specific, individual 
consumer, but are drafted in accordance to the image of an abstract, average consumer. After 
the legislator and/or the judge have/has investigated the circumstances under which the 
average consumer suffers from market failures - and thus encounters disadvantages of his 
weaker bargaining position - they seek to restore the market failure as optimal as possible
76
. 
This is a correct, but insufficient working hypothesis. 
A. Consumer Image and the Court of Justice 
29. Double consumer image – In the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice a double 
consumer image emerges. As we shall see below, the Court of Justice takes the image of the 
average informed consumer as the starting point in its jurisprudence on primary European 
                                                 
 
75
  For an overview: see a.o. J. VANNEROM, "Consumer Notion: Natural or Legal Persons and Mixed 
Contracts" in E. TERRYN, G. STRAETMANS and V. COLAERT (eds.), Landmark Cases of EU Consumer Law. 
In Honour of Jules Stuyck, Cambridge-Antwerp-Portland, Intersentia, 2013, 53-72. 
76
  For England: CROWTHER COMMITTEE, Consumer Credit. Report of the Committee, I, Report, London, HM 
Stationery Office, Cmnd 4596, 1971, 151-153. 
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Union law or on unfair commercial practices. In its jurisprudence on unfair terms the Court of 
Justice emphasizes the weaker bargaining position of consumers. As such the Court of Justice 
authorise a more far-reaching interference by the legislator and the national judges in the 
contractual relationship between the consumer and the trader. 
1. The consumer in the internal market and the law on commercial practices  
30. Development of the consumer image in the internal market – The primary European 
Union law regulates the functioning of the European Union and its internal market. It 
guarantees freedom of goods, persons, services and capital
77
. Member States may not impose 
quantitative import and export restrictions impeding intra-EU-trade
78
. Such national 
restrictions can be challenged before the Court of Justice. We speak about negative 
harmonisation. Indeed, here the European legislator does not actively regulate a particular 
product, service or sales method. The Court of Justice provides for an integrated internal 
market by eliminating national protectionist rules
79
. Consumer protection is often cited as a 
justification for such national restrictions. However, the Court of Justice inveighed against 
purely protectionist provisions enacted under the guise of consumer protection, but merely 
aimed to protect the national market. The judgment in Rewe-Zentral about the French liqueur 
Cassis de Dijon is probably the best known
80
. There were also a number of Belgian cases
81
. In 
reviewing national restrictions, the Court of Justice had to define who the consumer is or 
better what degree of protection he needs. The European consumer image is so largely 
developed by the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice on the freedom of goods and services. 
31. Jurisprudential evolution – The jurisprudential development started with a judgment of 
the Court of Justice of February 20, 1979
82
. In a case concerning the free movement of goods 
Rewe-Zentral AG asked to the 'Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein' an authorisation 
for the import of the spirit 'Cassis de Dijon' on the German market. A permit was not 
necessary according to the Bundesmonopolverwaltung. However it was not to be imported, as 
suppliers might only introduce on the market drinks with an alcohol content of at least 32%. 
The ban of import intended a.o. to protect the consumer against false assumptions about the 
                                                 
77
  Resp. art. 28; 45 and 49; 56; 63 VWEU. 
78
  Art. 34-35 VWEU. 
79
  J. GODDAER, E. TERRYN and J. VANNEROM, "Invloed van het Europese recht op het 
consumenten(contracten)recht" in I. SAMOY, V. SAGAERT and E. TERRYN (eds.), Invloed van het Europese 
recht op het Belgische privaatrecht, Antwerp-Cambridge, Intersentia, 2012, 473-478; I. RAMSAY, 
Consumer Law and Policy: Text and Materials on Regulating Consumer Markets. Third Edition, Oxford, 
Hart, 2012, 30-33. 
80
  ECJ 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein. 
81
  Cf. a.o. ECJ C-205/07, Criminal proceedings v. Lodewijk Gysbrechts and Santurel Inter BVBA; ECJ C-
20/03, Criminal proceedings v. Marcel Burmanjer, René Alexander Van Der Linden and Anthony De Jong; 
ECJ C-239/02, Douwe Egberts NV v. Westrom Pharma NV and Christophe Souranis and Douwe Egberts 
NV v. FICS-World BVBA; ECJ C-50/85, Berhard Schloh v. PVBA Auto contrôle technique; ECJ C-261/81, 
Walter Rau Lebensmittelwerke v. De Smedt PVBA. 
 For a detailed discussion: J. GODDAER, E. TERRYN and J. VANNEROM, "Invloed van het Europese recht op 
het consumenten(contracten)recht" in I. SAMOY, V. SAGAERT and E. TERRYN (eds.), Invloed van het 
Europese recht op het Belgische privaatrecht, Antwerp-Cambridge, Intersentia, 2012, 474-478. 
82
  S. GRUNDMANN and Y.M. ATAMER, "European Contract Law and Banking Contracts after the Financial 
Crisis: Challenges for Contracting and Market Transactions" in S. GRUNDMANN and Y.M. ATAMER (eds.), 
Financial Services, Financial Crisis and General European Contract Law. Failure and Challenges of 
Contracting, Kluwer Law International, Alphen a/d Rijn, 2011, 16. 
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consumed beverage. Rewe-Zentral appealed the decision. Ultimately the case came before the 
Court of Justice. The Court of Justice ruled that the information about the origin of the drink 
and the alcohol content
83
 was a less far-reaching restriction on cross-border trade than the 
imposition of a minimum alcohol content. The information paradigm as a means of consumer 
protection was born. 
Also in the case, the European Commission against Germany, the Court of Justice confirmed 
that the mandatory information disclosure to consumers is preferred above a ban on imports 
of products from other Member States. The German 'Reinheitsgebot' states that only 
beverages made from malted barley, hops, yeast and water may be traded as beer in Germany. 
The beer import from another Member State did not comply with this requirement. The Court 
of Justice preferred again mandatory information requirements over a ban. It is sufficient for a 
trader to notify the consumer that the beer, which he is to purchase does not meet the German 
'Reinheitsgebot', for example. The consumer can then with full knowledge make his choice
84
. 
The Court of Justice confirmed this view on the quest of the consumer to the 'characteristics' 
of a product in the Pall v. Dahlhausen judgment and continues to repeat it in subsequent 
judgments on the free movement of goods and services
85
. Some two years before the Pall v. 
Dahlhausen judgment the Court of Justice even ruled that each consumer has a right on 
information in the GB Inno case
86
. 
32. Basic knowledge of the average consumer – In the jurisprudence on the internal market 
and on misleading and unfair commercial practices the Court of Justice takes the average 
consumer as the standard for information disclosure
87
. In the Van Bennekom case the Court of 
Justice indicated for the first time what basic level of knowledge one can expect from the 
consumer. The consumer who evaluates medicinal products has an average discernment
88
. 
The Court of Justice refined this consumer image and speaks about the "average consumer 
who is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect"
89
. The national 
                                                 
83
  Consideration 14 ECJ 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein; cf. also 
consideration 25 Concl. N. FENNELY ECJ C-220/98, Estée Lauder Cosmetics GmbH & Co. OHG v. 
Lancaster Group GmbH. 
84
  Consideration 35 and 36 ECJ 178/84, Commission v. Germany (Reinheitsgebot). 
85
  Consideration 19 ECJ C-238/89, Pall Corp. v. P.J. Dahlhausen & Co.; cf. also consideration 24 ECJ C-
470/93, Verein gegen Unwesen in Handel und Gewerbe Köln eV. v. Mars GmbH; ECJ C-315/92, Verband 
Sozialer Wettbewerb eV v. Clinique Laboratoires SNC and Estée Lauder Cosmetics GmbH; consideration 
17 ECJ C-126/91, Schutzverband gegen Unwesen in der Wirtschaft eV. v. Yves Rocher GmbH; 
consideration 15-17 ECJ C-373/90, Nissan. 
86
  ECJ 362/88, GB Inno SA v. Confédération du Commerce luxembourgeois ASBL; L. GORMLEY, "The 
Consumer Acquis and the Internal Market", EBLR 2009, 417; J. STUYCK and G. STRAETMANS, Financiële 
diensten en de consument. Bankdiensten - Consumentenkrediet - Hypothecair krediet - Verzekeringen - 
Handelspraktijken volgens het Belgisch en Europees recht, Antwerp, Kluwer, 1994, 31-32; T. 
WILHELMSSON, G. HOWELLS and H.-W. MICKLITZ, "European Consumer Law" in M. BUSSANI and F. 
WERRO (eds.), European Private Law: a Handbook, Bern, Stämpfli, 2009, 270-271. 
87
  R. INCARDONA and C. PONCIBÒ, "The average consumer, the unfair commercial practices directive, and the 
cognitive revolution", JconsP 2007, 24. 
88
  Consideration 18 ECJ 227/82, Criminal proceeding v. Leendert Van Bennekom. 
89
  Consideration 27 ECJ C-220/98, Estée Lauder Cosmetics GmbH & Co. OHG v. Lancaster Group GmbH; 
consideration 36 ECJ C-303/97, Verbraucherschutzverein eV v. Sektkellerei G.C. Kessler GmbH und Co; 
consideration 31 ECJ C-210/96, Gut Springenheide GmbH en Rudolf Tusky v. Oberkreisdirektor des 
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courts may in their review of misleading and unfair commercial practices assume that a 
consumer is able to estimate the value of standard information. Advocate General GEELHOED 
even believes that a consumer, before he (first) purchases a product or service, will always 
take knowledge of the information on the label
90
. In the Darbo case also the Court of Justice 
held that the average informed and reasonable observant and circumspect consumer first looks 
at the list of ingredients. For example, if in this list the ingredient 'pectin' is mentioned, 
consumers can value the indication "purely natural" on the label. According to the Court of 
Justice, the labelling was not misleading
91
. 
33. The image of the 'searching informed consumer' – The Court of Justice adopts in its 
jurisprudence on the internal market and on misleading and unfair commercial practices the 
image of the average informed and reasonable observant and circumspect consumer
92
. The 
consumer is actively seeking information. Once he has sufficient and correct information, he 
can make a free and conscious decision
93
. 
2. The consumer in case of positive harmonisation 
34. Ex officio review of unfair terms – In the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice on unfair 
terms, however, a different consumer image emerges. The Court of Justice has repeatedly 
ruled that Directive 93/13/EEC misses its goal, if the consumer himself has to raise the 
unfairness of a contract term. The consumer is in fact in a weak bargaining position, partly 
because he has less information than the company
94
. According to the Court of Justice article 
                                                                                                                                                        
MEEUSEN, G. STRAETMANS and A.-M. VAN DEN BOSSCHE (eds.), Het EG-consumentenacquis: nu en straks, 
Antwerp, Intersentia, 2009, 7-8. 
90
  Consideration 54 Concl. L.A. GEELHOED by ECJ C-239/02, Douwe Egberts NV v. Westrom Pharma NV 
and Christophe Souranis and Douwe Egberts NV v. FICS-World BVBA.  
 This was already been mentioned. Cf. consideration 25 Concl. N. FENNELY by ECJ C-220/98, Estée Lauder 
Cosmetics GmbH & Co. OHG v. Lancaster Group GmbH. 
 Cf. also R. INCARDONA and C. PONCIBÒ, "The average consumer, the unfair commercial practices directive, 
and the cognitive revolution", JconsP 2007, 30. 
91
  Consideration 20 ECJ C-465/98, Verein gegen Unwesen in Handel und Gewerbe Köln eV v. Adorf Darbo 
AG. 
 Cf. also consideration 12 ECJ 27/80, Criminal proceeding v. Anton Adriaan Fietje in which the Court 
stated that in some cases indications and signs are sufficient. 
92
  Consideration 27 ECJ C-220/98, Estée Lauder Cosmetics GmbH & Co. OHG v. Lancaster Group GmbH; 
consideration 36 ECJ C-303/97, Verbraucherschutzverein eV v. Sektkellerei G.C. Kessler GmbH und Co; 
consideration 31 ECJ C-210/96, Gut Springenheide GmbH and Rudolf Tusky v. Oberkreisdirektor des 
Kreises Steinfurt. 
93
  J. STUYCK and G. STRAETMANS, Financiële diensten en de consument. Bankdiensten - Consumentenkrediet 
- Hypothecair krediet - Verzekeringen - Handelspraktijken volgens het Belgisch en Europees recht, 
Antwerp, Kluwer, 1994, 31-32. 
94
  Consideration 25-26 ECJ C-240/98-C-244/98, Oceano Grupo Editorial SA v. Rocio Murciano Quintero. 
 Cf. also consideration 41 ECJ C-618/10, Banco Espanol de Credito SA v. Joaquin Calderon Camino; 
consideration 48-49 ECJ C-137/08, VB Pénzügyi Lízing Zrt. v. Ferenc Schneider; consideration 31 ECJ C-
40/08, Asturcom Telecomunicaciones SL v. Cristina Rodríguez Nogueira; consideration 26 and 38 ECJ C-
168/05, Elias Maria Mostaza Claro v. Centro Movil Milenium; consideration 33 ECJ C-473/00, Cofidis SA 
v. Jean-Louis Fredout; I. DEMUYNCK, De inhoudelijke controle van onrechtmatige bedingen: onderzoek 
van de Wet van 14 juli 1991 op de handelspraktijken en de voorlichting van de consument, doctoraatsthesis 
UGent, 2000, 711; R. STEENNOT, "Sanctionering van inbreuken op het consumentenrecht: de zoektocht 
naar een rechtvaardige oplossing" in F. EVERS and P. LEFRANC (eds.), Kiezen tussen recht en 
rechtvaardigheid, Bruges, Die Keure, 2009, 147; A. VAN OEVELEN, "Enkele actuele knelpunten in het 
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6 of Directive 93/13/EEC aims to "replace the formal balance which the latter establishes 
between the rights and obligations of the parties with an effective balance which re-
establishes equality between them"
95
. Therefore, the court must assess ex officio unfair terms. 
The ex officio assessment offers the consumer also a preventative protection against unfair 
terms. Traders will abstain from including unfair terms in the agreement. Indeed, the court has 
to declare the unfair contract term as not binding
96
. When assessing out of its own motion 
unfair terms, the national court may not violate the right of defence, though. The Court of 
Justice extended this ex officio assessment of unfair terms to all types of consumer contracts. 
It is only required that the agreement falls ratione materiae and personae within the scope of 
Directive 93/13/EEC. Thus, the national court should also assess of its own motion interest 
clauses and clauses for non-performance in a consumer credit agreement
97
. The Court of 
Justice also emphasized that a court must investigate ex officio whether a term falls within the 
scope of Directive 93/13/EEC
98
. However, the scope of the judgment is not yet clear
99
. 
                                                                                                                                                        
verbintenissenrecht", RW 2011-12, 56; C. WILLETT, Fairness in consumer contracts: the case of unfair 
terms, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2007, 99-101. 
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  Consideration 36 ECJ C-168/05, Elias Maria Mostaza Claro v. Centro Movil Milenium. 
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v. Jean-Louis Fredout; J. GODDAER, E. TERRYN and J. VANNEROM, "Invloed van het Europese recht op het 
consumenten(contracten)recht" in I. SAMOY, V. SAGAERT and E. TERRYN (eds.), Invloed van het Europese 
recht op het Belgische privaatrecht, Antwerp-Cambridge, Intersentia, 2012, 537. 
 Cf. consideration 32 ECJ C-243/08, Pannon GSM Zrt. v. Erzsébet Sustikné Györfi; consideration 23 ECJ C-
472/11, Banif Plus Bank Zrt v. Csaba Csipai and Viktoria Csipai; consideration 43 ECJ C-618/10, Banco 
Espanol de Credito SA v. Joaquin Calderon Camino. 
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  Consideration 61-63 ECJ C-429/05, Max Rampion and Marie-Jeanne Godard v. Franfinance SA and K par 
K SAS; consideration 32 ECJ C-473/00, Cofidis SA v. Jean-Louis Fredout; C. BIQUET-MATHIEU, "Les 
contrats du consommateur en Belgique" in X (ed.), Travaux de l' Association Henri Capitant des amis de la 
culture juridique française, LVII/2007, Brussels, Bruylant, 2010, 42. 
 Cf. also ECJ C-415/11, Mohamed Aziz v. Caixa d'Estalvis de Catalunya, Tarragona i Manresa 
(Catalunyacaixa); ECJ C-227/08, Eva Martin Martin v. EDP Editores, SL; prejudical question of the 
Tribunal d'instance d'Orléans of May 30, 2013 in the case ECJ C-298/13, Facet SA and BNP Paribas 
Personal Finance SA v. Saïda Bouchelaghem e.a.; prejudical question of Juzgado de Primera Instancia de 
Palma de Mallorca (Spain) of May 22, 2013 in the case C-280/13, Barclays Bank S.A. v. Sara Sanchez 
Garcia en Alejandro Chacon Barrera; prejudical question of Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Palma de 
Mallorca (Spain) of March 11, 2013 in the case C-116/13, Banco de Valencia SA v. Joaquin Valldeperas 
Tortosa en Maria Angeles Miret Jaume. 
 Cf. Concl. N. WAHL by ECJ C-482/12, Peter Macinsky and Eva Macinska v. Getfin s.r.o. and Financreal 
s.r.o. 
98
  Consideration 56 ECJ C-137/08, VB Pénzügyi Lízing Zrt. v. Ferenc Schneider. 
 Cf. in the Pannon case the Court of Justice ruled for the first time the national court has to investigate the 
unfair character of a contract term. However, the court had to rely on the factual and legal material given by 
the parties of the trial. Cf. consideration 32 ECJ C-243/08, Pannon GSM Zrt. v. Erzsébet Sustikné Györfi. 
99
  J. GODDAER, E. TERRYN and J. VANNEROM, "Invloed van het Europese recht op het 
consumenten(contracten)recht" in I. SAMOY, V. SAGAERT and E. TERRYN (eds.), Invloed van het Europese 
recht op het Belgische privaatrecht, Antwerp-Cambridge, Intersentia, 2012, 541. 
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35. Ex officio review of remedies – Recently, the Court of Justice in the Duarte Hueros case 
said that a court should raise ex officio the remedies granted by Directive 1999/44/EC
100
, if 
the consumer in his initial claim can not specify himself his remedies or is not authorised to 
introduce a new procedure. The Court of Justice firstly points out the principle of procedural 
autonomy of the Member States
101
. National procedural rules must not violate the principle of 
effectiveness. They may not make the enforcement by the consumer of his rights under 
Directive 1999/44/EC extremely difficult or impossible
102
. 
36. Distance contracts – The consumer image of the weaker contracting party does not only 
appear in the jurisprudence on unfair terms. The Court of Justice also cites other reasons for 
which the consumer is in a weaker bargaining position. For example, the consumer can be in a 
vulnerable position because the trader is looking for him at his home. In those cases, the Court 
of Justice put forward more stringent requirements on the protection of consumers, a.o. 
through stricter information requirements
103
. In the Buet case representatives of SARL 
Educational Business Services visited consumers at their home and offered them English 
courses. The Court of Justice ruled that certain distance contracts put consumers in a 
particularly vulnerable position. "The potential purchaser often belongs to a category of 
people who, for one reason or another, are behind with their education and are seeking to 
catch up. That makes them particularly vulnerable when faced with salesmen of educational 
material who attempt to persuade them that if they use that material they will have better 
employment prospects"
104
. 
37. The image of the 'consumer in a weaker (bargaining) position' – The Court of Justice 
uses a different consumer image in its jurisprudence on unfair terms and on the remedies 
which can be claimed under Directive 1999/44/EC. It is a consumer image which we also 
fount in the jurisprudence on distance contracts. In these areas the Court of Justice is less 
reluctant to and accepts easier certain restrictions on the freedom of contract justified by the 
need for consumer protection. This enhanced protection is, according to the Court of Justice, 
justified because the consumer is in a weaker bargaining position. The consumer can not 
easily negotiate contractual terms
105
. Often, the trader will submit its standard agreement for 
                                                 
100
  Directive 1999/44/EC of the Europeans Parliament and the Council of May 25, 1999 on certain aspects of 
the sale of consumer goods, Pb.L. July 7, 1999, 12-16. 
101
  Consideration 31 ECJ C-32/12, Soledad Duarte Hueros v. Autociba SA and Automoviles Citroën Espana 
SA. 
102
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Espana SA. 
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  ECJ C-382/87, Criminal proceeding v. R. Buet and SARL Educational Business Services; J. STUYCK and G. 
STRAETMANS, Financiële diensten en de consument. Bankdiensten - Consumentenkrediet - Hypothecair 
krediet - Verzekeringen - Handelspraktijken volgens het Belgisch en Europees recht, Antwerp, Kluwer, 
1994, 31. 
104
  Consideration 13 ECJ C-382/87, Criminal proceeding v. R. Buet and SARL Educational Business Services. 
Contra: consideration 20 ECJ C-239/90, SCP Boscher, Studer and Fromentin v. SA British Motors Wright 
and others; J. STUYCK and G. STRAETMANS, Financiële diensten en de consument. Bankdiensten - 
Consumentenkrediet - Hypothecair krediet - Verzekeringen - Handelspraktijken volgens het Belgisch en 
Europees recht, Antwerp, Kluwer, 1994, 32. In the arrest Boscher the Court of Justice stated that obstacles 
to the free movement of goods are not allowed because the sales in question were directed to "buyers who 
particularly wary." They were, after all, specialised buyers. More importantly here is the observation that 
the judgment was about the single market, where The Court of Justice is more reticent. 
105
  ECJ C-240/98-C-244/98, Oceano Grupo Editorial SA v. Rocio Murciano Quintero, where the Court of 
Justice is suggesting that "system of protection elaborated by the Directive is based on the idea that the 
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signature without the consumer being able to amend or negotiate certain terms
106
. Moreover, 
the consumer can not always (fully) enforce his rights, because it is made extremely difficult 
or impossible by national procedural law
107
. 
3. Double consumer image 
38. Double consumer image: two criteria – The consumer image can not be reduced to a 
homogeneous image. The Court of Justice uses in certain cases, the image of the 'searching 
informed consumer'. In other judgments it stresses the consumer's weaker bargaining position, 
who is not able to claim the rights he possesses out of his own motion. In the current legal 
doctrine one finds two criteria providing a possible explanation for the double consumer 
image. 
39. Specific circumstances as criterion – STUYCK and STRAETMANS deduce from the 
jurisprudence of the Court of Justice a double consumer image
108
. The Court of Justice starts, 
in principle, from a rational consumer who is looking for useful information and who, once he 
has the correct information, can make a free and informed decision
109
. Opposite, stands the 
weak consumer or the consumer who is particularly vulnerable in certain situations
110
. 
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  Consideration 46 ECJ C-137/08, VB Pénzügyi Lízing Zrt. v. Ferenc Schneider; consideration 29 ECJ C-
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Intersentia, 2011, 24-25. 
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  ECJ C-32/12, Soledad Duarte Hueros v. Autociba SA and Automoviles Citroën Espana SA. 
108
  G. STRAETMANS, "Some thoughts on the future European consumer acquis", EBLR 2009, 429; G. 
STRAETMANS, "Het Europese consumentenacquis: genese en toekomstblik" in J. MEEUSEN, G. 
STRAETMANS and A.-M. VAN DEN BOSSCHE (eds.), Het EG-consumentenacquis: nu en straks, Antwerp, 
Intersentia, 2009, 8; J. STUYCK and G. STRAETMANS, Financiële diensten en de consument. Bankdiensten - 
Consumentenkrediet - Hypothecair krediet - Verzekeringen - Handelspraktijken volgens het Belgisch en 
Europees recht, Antwerp, Kluwer, 1994, 30 and 272-273. 
 Cf. also P. ROTT, "'Responsible lending' – Vorsorge statt Nachsorge?" in G.M. PEER (ed.), Die soziale 
Dimension des Zivilrechts – Zivilrecht zwischen Liberalismus und sozialer Verantwortung: Salzburger 
Tagung 10. bis 13. Sept. 2003, Munich, Boorberg, 2004, 181-182. 
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  Examples: ECJ C-210/96, Gut Springenheide GmbH and Rudolf Tusky v. Oberkreisdirektor des Kreises 
Steinfurt; ECJ C-126/91, Schutzverband gegen Unwesen in der Wirtschaft eV. v. Yves Rocher GmbH; ECJ 
C-238/89, Pall Corp. v. P.J. Dahlhausen & Co.; ECJ 362/88, GB Inno SA v. Confédération du Commerce 
luxembourgeois ASBL; ECJ 178/84, Commissie v. Bondsrepubliek Duitsland (Reinheitsgebot). 
110
  Example: ECJ 382/87, Criminal proceeding v. R. Buet and SARL Educational Business Services; J. 
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Kluwer, 1994, 39. 
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40. Harmonisation method as criterion – UNBERATH and JOHNSTON link the rationale of the 
double consumer image to the chosen harmonisation method
111
. In case of negative 
harmonisation they see a certain reluctance of the Court of Justice to accept national 
restrictions on fundamental freedoms. On the contrary, when positive harmonisation is at 
hand, the Court of Justice gives a broader significance and interpretation to (the protection of 
the consumer in) the European directives. They conclude that the consumer image in negative 
harmonisation is more limited than in positive harmonisation
112
. Some authors stress, though, 
European consumer law in practice is not as black or white as this criterion might suggest this 
split. Indeed, the Court of Justice does not always give a broad interpretation to European 
directives
113
. 
§4. Proposal for a multi-layered consumer image 
A. Notion of the 'Multi-Layered Consumer' 
41. Going further... – To get out of this impasse, there are grosso modo two options114. We 
can either join one (majority) group or depart from it and propose our own working 
hypothesis. As the title of this number suggests, we choose the latter option. This does not 
mean that we reject the current consumer notion and image. They have their merits and are 
still the reference point for the current legislation, doctrine and jurisprudence. We would like 
to build further on it. The truth lies indeed somewhere in the middle. 
42. Consumer Notion – Firstly, we want to address shortly the consumer notion. We prefer 
to limit the consumer notion to any natural person acting primarily for non-business purposes. 
Thus we use the traditional consumer notion, but we do not follow its restrictive 
interpretation. In addition, we keep the policy choice open to provide in certain situations a 
similar protection to other weaker contracting parties, such as SMEs. 
43. Our proposal: the 'multi-layered consumer' – Our proposed consumer image is 
somewhat innovative. Starting from the situation-specific nature of consumer law, it seems 
logical that the consumer image may change in function of specific situations in which the 
consumer finds himself. For some consumers it is sufficient to provide information, for others 
the way the information is received is equally important, while for some other consumers it is 
necessary for the legislator to intervene in the substantive contract equilibrium between the 
rights and obligations of the contracting parties resulting from the (credit) agreement. It is 
also of great importance to define the situations in which we will apply our model. This study 
does not claim that the model should be used as a working hypothesis and the basis for all 
legal rules on consumer (contracts). According to us, it may offer advantages in consumer 
                                                 
111
  H. UNBERATH and A. JOHNSTON, "The Double-Headed Approach of the ECJ concerning Consumer 
Protection", CMLR 2007, 1281. 
112
  H. UNBERATH and A. JOHNSTON, "The Double-Headed Approach of the ECJ concerning Consumer 
Protection", CMLR 2007, 1281-1282. 
113
  J. STUYCK, "Setting the scene" in H.-W. MICKLITZ, J. STUYCK, E.TERRYN and D. DROSHOUT (eds.), Cases, 
Materials and Text on Consumer Law. Ius Commune Casebooks for the Common Law of Europe, Portland, 
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17). 
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credit law. We propose a three-part model and introduce the image of the 'Informed 
Consumer', the 'Advised Consumer' and at least the 'Weak Consumer'
115
. 
The consumer image of the first category (the 'Informed Consumer') corresponds to the 
consumer image developed by the Court of Justice in its jurisprudence on the internal market 
and unfair commercial practices. Legal provisions for this category are to based upon the 
image of the average informed, observant and circumspect consumer who is searching 
information and can give an informed consent afterwards. Although he is formally free to 
enter into agreements, he nonetheless is in a weaker bargaining position as a consumer due to 
the initial information asymmetry. Providing correct and complete information is sufficient 
for him to take a correct and rational decision
116
. The legal provisions that are to be 
introduced for this category of consumers, ensure the substantive contractual freedom of the 
consumer. It is important that the information provided is accurate, realistic
117
 and sufficient 
and allows for comparison between creditors
118
. 
The consumer image of the second category (the 'Advised Consumer') is based on the 
condition precedent that a consumer does not always (fully) read or understand the 
information he receives. This consumer must receive additional personal advice before 
entering into a credit agreement. Based on the information obtained and the personal advice 
provided he can freely conclude a credit agreement. For this category of consumers the rules 
still ensure a substantive freedom of contract. However, they impose an additional mandatory 
information requirement to the creditor. 
The consumer image of the third and last category (the 'Weak Consumer'), is partly based on 
the results of behavioural economic studies that show that some consumers need permanent 
assistance. They can not take any rational decision, because they are financially incapable of 
doing so. Indeed any kind of information or advice here seems inefficient from a cost-benefit 
analysis. This group includes also the consumer who is, due to his weak financial situation, in 
                                                 
115
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a vulnerable position. For this group, the legal provisions must not only guarantee the 
substantive contractual freedom of the consumer, they should also ensure that there exists a 
(substantive) contract equilibrium, for example through the introduction of legal interest rate 
caps, rules on compound interest, default interest rate caps, etc.
119
. Here the corrective 
function of consumer contract law is the greatest. The legislator and the judge restrict the 
freedom of choice of the parties the most. Consequently one should be careful when 
classifying certain types of consumers into this category. Consumer contract law gets here, 
after all, a redistributive function. 
B. Applicability in consumer credit legislation 
44. Applicability in consumer credit legislation – After defining our three categories, we 
examine how the creditor can classify in concreto a consumer into one of the categories. The 
answer looks simple. The creditor, whether he grants credit to a professional borrower or to a 
consumer, shall examine his creditworthiness. He may use the results of this assessment to 
classify the prospective borrower into one of the categories. We introduce a 'know-your-
borrower'-rule
120
. Thus the creditor is able to restrict his operational costs, since he is obliged 
to perform a creditworthiness assessment
121
. We only propose to add  de lege ferenda to this 
credit assessment a suitability assessment. In addition to assessing the financial strength, the 
creditor would question the prospective borrower about the content, scope,... and expectations 
about the credit agreement offered. On this basis, the creditor, could classify the (prospective) 
borrower into one of the three categories. The criteria used to categorize shall be made 
transparent and public. The borrower must be able to ascertain these criteria. Secondly, it is 
equally important that a court can review a posteriori the classification
122
. In addition, the 
supervisory authority for financial institutions could play a role in the approval and review of 
the criteria used by the creditor. 
45. Critical evaluation of the model – New proposals must be received and evaluated 
critically. Although we argue below that the new model is not earth-shattering, we still try to 
refute some possible criticisms. Following three questions arise: 
 How does the trend to extend consumer protection to other weaker contracting parties 
– such as SMEs – suit in the proposed model? 
 Does the model not introduce an assessment in concreto? Do we not incur the risk of 
making the consumer image status dependent?  
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 How does this model relate to the proportionality rule123 in consumer law? 
An attentive reader will already have got some flashes of recognition. Our proposed Multi-
Layered Consumer Image and its implementation sounds like to the 'know-your-client'-rule 
and the three categories of investor protection. The proposed model is based on intra- and 
interdisciplinary (legal) comparison. Intradisciplinary, because it falls back to the legal 
provisions on investor protection. From the MiFID legislation, we learn among others that the 
degree of the restrictions on freedom of contract of the financial institution do not necessarily 
have to be the same for every investor
124
. Financial law already knows for some time the 
possibility to fill in the rules of conduct, the information requirements applicable to certain 
institutions, etc. differently depending on the category of persons entitled to protection
125
. In 
this paper we proposed to extend the creditworthiness assessment by the creditor with a 
suitability test. The creditor must de lege lata examine each prospective borrower on its 
financial capacity. De lege ferenda he should also ascertain the financial capability of the 
prospective borrower.  
Interdisciplinary we rely on certain behavioural economic studies that show that the group of 
consumers is not a homogeneous one. These studies show that some consumers are more 
susceptible to misleading information and are more financially incompetent than others
126
. 
The group of consumer is too heterogeneous to enact rules based on one consumer image. A 
diversifying approach is more desirable. 
The consumer credit law sensu stricto allows a certain degree of diversification of consumers. 
Article 5 (6) Directive 2008/48/EC obliges a creditor to provide to the consumer appropriate 
explanations so that the latter can make an informed decision. The appropriate explanation 
involves more than delivering a information leaflet with mere general information on interest 
rates, etc. It is an obligation to give personal advice. Opposite to our model article 5 (6) 
Directive 2008/48/EC suggests an assessment in concreto of each individual consumer, while 
our model consists of three abstract categories that determine the degree of legal or judicial 
restrictions/interference in the freedom of contract (of the creditor). However our model is not 
necessarily in contradiction with article 5 (6) Directive 2008/48/EC. We do not require the 
creditor to give each consumer a personalised appropriate explanation. In our model the 
personal appropriate explanations are limited to the second (and third) category of consumers. 
We only use the discretionary power left by the European legislator to the Member States to 
fill in the appropriate explanations depending on "the specific circumstances of the situation  
in which the credit agreement is offered, the person to whom it is offered and the type of 
credit offered"
127
. Although we use an abstract category that introduces a seemingly per se 
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obligation to give personalised advice to certain categories of consumers. It is always up to 
the creditor to determine in concreto which consumer falls under which category. It remains, 
albeit indirectly, an assessment in concreto whether a consumer needs an personalised 
appropriate explanation
128
. Thus, it does not go further than Directive 2008/48/EC. Although 
the content of the information and advice requirements are set in abstracto, a specific 
consumer is not blindly assigned to one category. Firstly, there will be a thorough in concreto 
assessment per individual consumer by the creditor. Based on the concrete result the 
consumer will be categorised into one of the categories. So there is no general per se 
obligation to provide advice or information to each consumer, but only for those consumers 
belonging to a category requiring additional protection. Also under article 5 (6) Directive 
2008/48/EC, these consumers shall – even without categorisation in our model – obtain 
appropriate explanations to make an informed decision. The model can further absorb the 
rapid changes in the field of credit services without having to adapt each time the 
legislation
129
. The basic principles of the model, i.e. only provide information, advice and 
information or permanent substantive support where needed, are independent of concrete 
products. Finally, as clarified above vis-à-vis investor protection, it is clear the multi-layered 
consumer image is not earth-shattering. Let us now discuss the above-mentioned three critical 
questions. 
Firstly, it is clear that a multi-layered consumer image does not prevent the level of consumer 
protection provided to be extended to other weaker contracting parties such as SMEs. The 
legislator may subject professional borrowers to the same 'know-your-borrower' rule and offer 
them a similar protection
130
. 
The criticism that a multi-layered consumer image could degenerate into a 'status dependent' 
consumer image dividing consumers into compartments according to their education, their 
social origin, etc., is unjustified. An abstract distinction between categories of consumers does 
not stigmatise the individual consumer in a concrete situation. It also does not necessarily lead 
to social exclusion. To make a quip, a lawyer is not necessarily an Informed Consumer. Each 
consumer will have to demonstrate in concreto during the creditworthiness/suitability 
assessment his level of financial capability
131
. Moreover, de lege lata courts take already into 
account the specific situation of the (contracting) parties. Through the moderating effect of 
good faith, the court can indeed take into account in its assessment the weaker bargaining 
power of a particular contracting party. 
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The multi-layered consumer image also takes into consideration the subsidiarity and 
proportionality requirement. Under these requirements, preference should be given to the least 
intrusive legal measure and the least intrusive judicial action
132
. For the first two categories of 
consumers the mandatory information requirements and cooling-off periods should, in 
principle, be sufficient to ensure that the substantive contractual freedom is assured. For the 
Weak Consumer, the legislator and the courts should possibly also provide for a substantive 
assessment of the contract equilibrium. 
§5. Conclusion. 
46. Substantive rules in consumer credit legislation – Legislators introduce more and more 
restrictions on the freedom of contract of the stronger contracting party. In (consumer) credit 
legislation this trend was already present for a longer time. The lack of information and the 
weaker bargaining position resulting of the financial necessity to buy goods or services on 
credit is indeed more robustly present in (consumer) credit law. Most restrictions safeguard 
not only the substantive contractual freedom of the consumer, but they want to prevent that 
the consumer enters into a negative debt spiral (e.g.: rules of compound interest) or that he has 
to pay an unreasonable and unbalanced price for obtaining credit (e.g.: prohibition of usury 
interest and legal interest rate caps
133
). In addition to these legal restrictions courts may also 
interfere in the contract equilibrium of the parties in case of unforeseen changes in 
circumstances. He may grant a deferred payment or other repayment facilities. These legal 
and judicial reviews mostly are in favour / are introduced protect the customer. It is justified 
by the lack of information and his weaker bargaining position. 
47. Multi-layered Consumer Image – We introduced a multi-layered consumer image. Its 
goal is to distribute as efficiently as possible the need for legal consumer protection. 
Behavioural law and economics indicated that all consumers are in need of the same level of 
protection. For some mandatory information requirements is sufficient. For others advise or 
even substantive consumer protection, such as interest rate caps, are to be adopted. Our goal 
was to set up the legal framework. We strongly recommend economists to pick up this idea 
and enrol empirical studies to (i) analyse if the multi-layered consumer image can be a 
workable hypothesis in consumer credit law and (ii) provide empirical data that should enable 
legislators, courts, creditors... fine-tuning the legal framework in practice. Economists could 
empirically analyse if the multi-layered consumer image maximises the cooperative surplus of 
the contracting parties
134
. 
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